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ABSTRACT 
  
The recent big tickets include Microsoft acquiring part of Nokia for US$ 
7.2 billion, Verizon buy 45% stake in Vodafone for US$130 billion, 
Google acquiring Motorola for 12.5 billion. These buyouts are analyzed 
and commented by experts of the industry. This research paper 
attempted to collate their view in the context of Microsoft and Nokia 
deal on six parameters. These parameters are (i) reasons for the 
downfall of the Nokia market share, (ii) general comments of the 
experts, (iii) similarities / dissimilarities of past and business models of 
the smartphone business, (iv) reasons for Microsoft to buy out Nokia, 
(vi) impact of buyout on Microsoft, Nokia, consumers and markets. In 
addition, paper discusses the existing theories of merger & acquisition 
in telecom sector in the past.   
 
Keyword: Smartphone, Microsoft, Nokia, HERE Maps, Galaxy, Lumia, 
Synergy Trap Hypothesis.
  
[http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/us/] 
Licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 3.0 United States License 
 
INDEPENDENT JOURNAL OF MANAGEMENT & PRODUCTION (IJM&P) 
http://www.ijmp.jor.br               v. 5, n. 3, June - September 2014 
ISSN: 2236-269X 
DOI: 10.14807/ijmp.v5i3.166 
599 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 According to Redmond (2013), Microsoft will pay EUR 3.79 billion to purchase 
substantially all of Nokia’s Devices & Services business, and EUR 1.65 billion to 
license Nokia’s patents, for a total transaction price of EUR 5.44 billion in cash. 
Microsoft will draw upon its overseas cash resources to fund the transaction. The 
transaction is expected to close in the first quarter of 2014, subject to approval by 
Nokia’s shareholders, regulatory approvals and other closing conditions. Microsoft 
CEO Steven Ballmer told reporters at Nokia's headquarters in Finland, “It's a 
signature event”. 
 Walton (2013) and other experts commented on Microsoft-CEO statement in 
the context of buying Nokia. They said his justification is based on four factors. 
These are (i) acceleration of phone share; CEO Microsoft quoted the success of 
Lumia in the context, (ii) strengthens overall opportunity; CEO Microsoft mentioned 
that Windows Phone will improve the health of the entire Windows ecosystem. 
Microsoft believes that the traditional role of Windows in enterprise software will help 
elevate Windows Phone into the workplace as well as in the home segment what it 
called the “consumerization of IT”. Microsoft believed that increased smartphone 
sales will lead to increased tablet sales and increased tablet sales will lead to 
increased PC sales. It will help Microsoft to recreate every Google and Apple service 
for Windows Phone, (iii) smart acquisition; CEO Microsoft mentioned that the 
purchase used offshore cash so as not to have any impact on investors. Nokia 
purchase will help company’s Windows Phone business to achieve breakeven of 50 
million devices faster, (iv) strong execution plan; he mentioned that Nokia will 
continue operating as it is with minimal interference coming from the merger. The 
Nokia executive team will join Microsoft, but actual phone development will continue 
unabated in Finland.  
 Further to it, Microsoft believes that there is an urgent need of having a mobile 
handset device business, if Microsoft wishes to compete with Google and Apple. 
However, the experts and the market have different views on the buyout. Sizable 
segment of the market does not report it a best buyout for Microsoft.  
 In any case, the success and failure of the Microsoft and Nokia deal will have 
huge impact on the phone business across the globe. Keeping in view the 
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importance of such deal in mobile phone market, this research is attempted with two 
objectives. 
Objective 1:  To present an analysis of the very recent views expressed by experts 
and members of eco-systems of mobile communication industry. These 
views are mainly with respect to impact on eco-systems of mobile 
industry, acquirer Microsoft and bought out company Nokia.   
Objective 2: To established similarities with earlier theories/findings of merger and 
acquisition of telecom sector such as synergy trap hypothesis 
(MYEONG-CHEOL, et al. 2002), asset efficiency hypotheses (SALLEH, 
et al. 2013; BARKEMA; SCHIJVEN, 2008), hypothesis with respect to 
innovative performance of the acquiring firm and similarities in 
knowledge base of acquired firm (CLOODT, et al. 2006), and ethical 
conduct of mergers and acquisition have relations with job performance 
(LIN; WEI, 2006).      
2. METHODOLOGY 
 The methodology adopted in this research work is exploratory cum descriptive 
in nature. The methodology of the study is designed keeping in view above two 
objectives of the study. Most of the data used in the study is secondary data 
collected from the articles, news reports, press releases published on the web before 
and after the buyout of Nokia phone business by Microsoft. These sources are very 
recent. The analysis is similar to content analysis. Key words and phrases were 
identified from the secondary sources with respect to (i) reasons for downfall of 
Nokia, (ii) general views on the deal in the market, (iii) similarities & dissimilarities of 
the past & business models in relation to merger & acquisition activities of 
competitors in the market, (iv) specific reasons for Microsoft to buy Nokia, (v) impact 
on the stakeholders.   
 In addition, analysis of the Microsoft-Nokia deal is done with the following 
earlier theories/ researches of the past with respect to telecom company’s merger 
and acquisition. 
(i) Synergy Trap Hypothesis: It says that immediately before and after an 
acquisition announcement, the acquiring firm’s stock price is negatively 
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affected and the target firm’s stock price is positively affected. (MYEONG-
CHEOL, et al. 2002). 
(ii) Technical Efficiency: Merger & Acquisition (M&A) activities are one of the 
routes to enhance relative technical efficiency in an effort to increase the 
overall efficiency which would later be translated into increase revenue. 
(SALLEH, et al. 2013); BARKEMA; SCHIJVEN, 2008). 
(iii) Innovative performance: Non-technological M&As appear to have a negative 
impact on the acquiring firm’s post-M&A innovative performance. With respect 
to technological M&As, a large relative size of the acquired knowledge base 
reduces the innovative performance of the acquiring firm (CLOODT et al. 
2006).  
(iv) Ethical conduct: Ethical conduct in M&A is significantly correlated with 
employee job performance (LIN; WEI, 2006). 
 It is difficult to prove all such theories at this stage since empirical evidences 
for some hypotheses are not yet available at present. But it was possible to have 
data  collected with respect to first and fourth hypotheses from the sources as listed 
above.  
 The data with respect to recent statistics of top smartphone operating systems 
(OS), shipments, and market share from 2008 to 2013, world wide mobile terminal 
sales to end users from 2009 to 2013, smart phone OS Shares in select countries for 
July 2012 & 2013 with a view to see the dominance of operating system providers 
and handset manufacturers.  
 In addition, data with respect to market share forecast of Operating System in 
India for 2017, and market share of feature phones and smart phones in India for the 
year 2Q 2011, 2Q 2012, 2Q 2013 was also collected to have an idea how the 
dynamics of a big market is behaving. The data is given in Table A1 to Table A6.     
3. REASONS OF DOWNFALL OF NOKIA 
 This section present reasons for the downfall of the Nokia. Analysis is based 
on mainly expert opinion of Murtazin (2010), Thompson (2013), Gassée (2012), Ciol 
(2012), Chang (2012), Ahonen (2013), Edwards (2013), Rox (2012), Lobo (2011), 
Fundey.com (2012), and Dominies Communicate (2013). 
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(i) Operating System & Apps: During August, Thompson (2013) wrote that both 
BlackBerry and Nokia had significant strengths in this stack: 
  “BlackBerry had differentiated hardware – there are people who still swear by 
their keyboards – and highly differentiated services, including BlackBerry 
Enterprise Server and BlackBerry Messenger” 
 “Nokia dominated all the parts of this stack you don’t see: they had, and in 
some respect, still have, the best supply chain and distribution network. In 
addition, they had high quality hardware that served every segment 
imaginable” 
 However, these strengths were missing in operating system & apps for 
success and compete. Ciol (2013) reported that operating system space was 
nearly occupied by Android and iOS and Window operating system does not 
have much role. 
(ii) Domination Blindness: Gassée (2012) mentioned that with its Microsoft 
Exchange integration; a solid personal information manager that neatly 
combines mail, calendar, and contacts; and the secure BlackBerry Messenger 
network, the "CrackBerry" is rightly perceived as the best smartphone on the 
market. The success blinded the management and it refuses to accept that 
the iPhone poses a threat to their dominance.  Apple and Google deploy 
technically superior software platforms that expose the BlackBerry's weaker 
underpinnings. In 2010, RIM acquires the QNX operating system in an effort 
to rebuild its software foundations, but it's too late. 
Story is the same for Nokia. In 2007 Nokia was the world's largest mobile 
phone maker, but Nokia could not see the technical shortcomings of aging 
Symbian, or the utility of their attempts to "mobilize" Linux. It allows iOS and 
Android devices quickly eat into Nokia's market share and market cap. 
(iii) Leadership: Ahonen (2013) listed the achievement of Elop, CEO of Nokia on 
three parameters, i.e., (i) Nokia revenue, Nokia profits, Standard & Poor 
Ratings of Nokia, (ii) handset revenue, profits, volumes, market share, and (iii) 
smart phone unit revenue, profits, volumes, market share. He concluded that 
Nokia was 50% bigger than Samsung when Elop joined & now Samsung is 
30% bigger than Nokia in handset market. In smartphone segment Nokia was 
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twice of number (2) Tim and Number (3) Apple and now even Samsung is 12 
times of Nokia. He rated him as worst CEO. Similar sentiments were shown 
by Edwards (2013) in the context of “Burning Platform” memo.    
(iv) Delay in giving up Symbian:  Nokia was slow to react on the aging features 
of Symbian which were not in line of consumer demands (CHANG, 2012; 
CIOL, 2012). Microsoft is still shipping the 2nd version of its Windows Phone 
OS, whereas Android and Apple are in their 10th version (Jelly Bean) and 7th 
version (iOS7) of Operating Systems (PATHAK, 2013).  
(v) Politics of Middle Management: Middle management of any organization 
plays a crucial role in sustaining the growth in all segments. However, Nokia 
middle management was highly publicized. It was focusing more on internal 
competition and their personal interest. The phenomenon of co-operation was 
missing at middle level (DOMINIES COMMUNICATE, 2013). 
(vi) Stiff Project Management: Exceedingly stiff project management model and 
management was another reason for lack of innovation and in turn downfall. 
Project management model was tuned to manufacturing process efficiency 
not for innovation. For the workforce it was difficult to innovate against the 
manufacturing process efficiency (DOMINIES COMMUNICATE, 2013).   
(vii) Nokia failed in the race with Samsung: Nokia could not market itself as 
innovator in the market (CHANG, 2012; CIOL, 2012). The price of Nokia 
phones has been higher than Samsung phones. In addition, Samsung has the 
capacity to launch new models in every 40 days while Nokia has very limited 
capacity of introducing new models (FUNDEY.COM, 2012).  
(viii) Hurt on the lower end and also by local vendors: Nokia did not anticipated 
competition in the lower end of the market.  Its competitors such as HTC, 
Huawei and ZTE, competed better in low-end emerging markets like China 
(CHANG, 2102). Similarly, in dual SIM emerging market of India where in 
Nokia could not compete with local vendors such Micromax, Haier, Spice 
Mobiles, Maxx Mobiles etc; due to its arrogance (LOBO, 2011). The story was 
a repeat of dual SIM card phones in other countries such as Russia. Nokia 
was slow to react (MURTAZIN, 2011). 
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(ix) Android paid off (for Samsung) and Windows Phone Hasn’t … Yet (for 
Nokia): Samsung bet on multiple platforms (Android, Windows Phone, and 
homegrown OS, Bada).  Android paid off handsomely. Samsung chose 
Android at the right time. Nokia, spent time on Symbian. Its partnership with 
Microsoft was too late from business perspective (CHANG, 2012).  
(x) Strategic Move in relation to MeeGo, Qt-A, Meltemi: Rox (2012) analyzed 
the strategies of the Nokia before February, 2011 and after arrival of Elop & 
concluded that “bad luck + bad execution of plans and mistakes of Elop (CEO 
Nokia) lead to the massive downfall. Utkarsh (2013) cited MeeGo as NoGo, a 
reason for the downfall of Nokia. He also cited that Ovi store never really took 
off. Linux based Melteni platform melted due to layoff of employees by Nokia. 
However, it continued to make investment in Qt-A. 
4. GENERAL COMMENTS / VIEWS/ STATEMENTS OF THE EXPERTS / 
RESEARCHERS 
 In the past experts, executives, researchers have expressed their views about 
the deal. They have described it as terrible idea to an excellent one in the context of 
economic environment across the globe. These views are listed in the following: 
(i) Data given in table 1 is an ample proof that this deal is not very costly in 
comparison to earlier ones. Nokia bought NAVTEQ for 8.1 billion, which is the 
forefather of today’s HERE Maps. It is included in Microsoft Nokia deal for 7.2 
billion. It is therefore cheap acquisition. 
(ii) Microsoft/Nokia deal is a terrible idea in the present context (MIMS, 2013). 
(iii) There is very little in this acquisition for the Microsoft. Microsoft’s, previous 
partnership with Nokia had yielded every bit of this deal as mentioned by 
Mobile Analyst Ben Thompson (MIMS, 2013). 
(iv) It is an act of “quiet desperation” that is unlikely to succeed (Om Malik of 
GigaOm (MIMS, 2013)). 
(v) It will drive volumes of business for Microsoft in mobile phone business 
domain CEO Microsoft (MIMS, 2013). 
(vi) It will triple Window Phone Market Share by 2018 in many markets across the 
globe (BLAGDON, 2013). 
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(vii) The layoff factor will be nil to nonexistent, as per Colliers International Senior 
Vice President Jim Beeger (DONATO-WEINSTEIN, 2013). It is contrary to 
Google-Motorola deal wherein layoff of 20% employees was announced as 
first step by Google after inking the deal (MILLER, 2012). The process of 
layoff by Google is continued during 2013 (ROWINSKI, 2013).   
(viii) The deal that make no sense (THOMPSON, 2013). 
(ix) Nokia buy makes it easier to envision cleaving Microsoft along devices and 
services lines of its business (FOLEY, 2013). 
(x) Nokia threat: Microsoft had to buy Nokia because Nokia was going to stop 
making Windows Phones very soon and planning to switch to Android (Views 
of the experts (GRALLA, 2013).  
(xi) It is a clear sign that Microsoft believes it can and must succeed in the phone 
business. It cannot afford to leave the success in the hands of a partner like 
Nokia. Microsoft’s phone software has managed to pass BlackBerry, but 
remains a distant No. 3 platform to Google’s Android and Apple’s iOS (FRIED, 
2013). 
(xii)  “It is combination of two weak companies. It will emerge as a strong new 
competitor in the phone domain is doubtful” said Paul Budde, a 
telecommunications consultant in Sydney. Further comments: “Both Nokia 
and Microsoft really missed the boat in terms of smartphones, and it is 
extremely difficult to claw your way back from that.” (BASS; HEISKANEN; 
FICKLING, 2013). 
(xiii) Metz (2013) reported that it will be a best shot to Microsoft in a world that’s 
quickly moving from desktops and laptops (Microsoft’s traditional domain) 
onto smartphones and tablets. Rise of Google’s Android mobile operating 
system and the Apple iPhone, forced Microsoft to change its ways.  
(xiv) Metz (2013) mentioned that Google bought Motorola, to better compete with 
Apple. Microsoft has bought Nokia to compete with both of them (Google & 
Apple). He also said that Microsoft is in habit of following Google & Apple. 
(xv) Three lessons for Nokia (a) Nokia should have not rested on its laurels, (b) 
Nokia should have challenged itself, and (iii) Nokia should have been 
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surrounded by Web companies or consumer-electronics manufacturers to 
succeed (LYNN, 2010). These lessons are true for today’s winners also.   
(xvi) On the capabilities of Window phone, a Senior Manager, Nokia Multimedia in 
T&T forum said that  “You can’t make a Ferrari sports model on top of Lada 
engine” (DOMINIES COMMUNICATE, 2013). 
(xvii) Nokia has strong carrier relationship with African telecom operators. It has 
brand equity, and excellent supply chain. It has a good position in Africa's 
dumb and feature phone segments. Microsoft will make advantages of it in 
future (HARRIS, 2013).  
(xviii) Garnry (2013) mentioned that “The job is not done for Nokia. In fact the 
struggle might continue, but today Nokia is the winner. Microsoft is no longer 
one obvious buyer of BlackBerry’s mobile division” now. 
(xix) Marek (2013) mentioned that “if history is any indication, it's clear that even 
when the strongest companies acquire weaker ones, it doesn't spell 
instantaneous success”. 
Table 1: Past Acquisition in $ Billion in the Domain 
SN Deal Year Amount 
1 Google buys Motorola Mobility 2011 12.5 Billion 
2 Microsoft buys Skype 2011 8.5 Billion 
3 Nokia buys NAVTEQ 2007 8.1 Billion 
4 Microsoft-Nokia deal 2013 7.2 Billion 
5 Nokia buys out Siemens out of NSN 2013 2.2 Billion 
6 Sony buys out Ericsson 2012 1.5 Billion 
7 NSN buys Motorola audio assets 2011 1.2 Billion 
8 Microsoft buys Yammer 2012 1.2 Billion 
9 Face book buys Instagram 2012 1.0 Billion 
10 Nokia sells Vertu 2012 0.26 Billion 
Source: Peter (2013), Hill (2012) 
5. SIMILARITIES & DISSIMILARITIES OF THE PAST & BUSINESS MODELS  
 Zeigler C. (2011) reported that Google dropped its "top five" Android partners 
to let them know that this Motorola acquisition was taking place. Microsoft has not 
done yet after making the announcement of acquiring Nokia. However, it is reported 
by the experts that it may be end to Window Phone Licenses (ROGOWSKY, 2013). 
 Google's primary goal was to shore up Android's shaky patent situation. 
Though it was not the exact case for Microsoft but Nokia buy out had increased the 
size of the basket of its patents.    
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 The smart device market has two basic business models as followed by Apple 
& Google. Additional models are also visible in the market & can be termed as 
Samsung Model or future Microsoft-Nokia Model. These models are listed as under: 
(i) Apple Model: Apple has focused on a closed vertical integration model where 
the device value is high and is based on a combination of software and 
hardware, and the cost model reflects that value. In addition, the closed 
nature of the ecosystem extends the control and the overall price (and 
underlying costs).  
 Baker (2013) mentioned that Apple has approached the market from the 
customer end, choosing to own the OS, most of the service infrastructure, the 
distribution as a way to keep as much revenue within their ecosystem and 
deliver profits. It is further moving back into the supply chain, developing its 
own processors for example. 
(ii) Google Model: Google model has as many devices as possible allow users 
to consume Google cloud services. It has opened up OS Android to a large 
set of device vendors, driving a market where the software has little to no cost 
and reflects lower product costs and prices. Though recently, it had acquired 
Motorola to have some intent of Apple Model.  
(iii) Samsung Model: Baker (2013) said that Samsung is primarily supply chain-
based business model. It is controlling much of the production of the 
components and it can better manage cost and supply. In addition, it rely on 
others partners to provide the front-end customer services such as support of 
distribution, software, Operating System, and services. Further, it is venturing 
in to these domains by having its own OS & other tools but these tools are not 
yet very popular.  
(iv) Microsoft Model: Microsoft business model will be somewhat similar to Apple 
and Samsung.  Microsoft has an OS basket, and other tools such as Skype & 
Lync that depend on open integration of smart device which none of the 
competitors have in the domain (EDHOLM, 2013). He added further, that 
Microsoft has been out-flanked for two of the cloud pillars, search and social. 
In addition, Microsoft has a reasonable position in the gaming pillar (Xbox 
Live) but it has minimal positions in entertainment (Netflix, Amazon Prime, 
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MSOs). It means, Microsoft's strength is in communications and productivity 
apps (Office 365). Still it has gaps. Nokia is the beginning of strategy which 
has filled the gap in the hardware segment. It also needs the client business 
the way Samsung and Apple do. In Microsoft environment its client partners 
are suffering. Even Nokia is an example. Window OS has failed to bailout it. 
After filling the gaps Microsoft may emerge with a better business model.   
6. REASONS FOR MICROSOFT TO BUYOUT NOKIA 
 The community of the experts came out with many reasons that are 
responsible for the deals between Microsoft and Nokia. These reasons are listed in 
the following. 
(i) To compete better with Android and iOS & also to take full control of its 
smartphone destiny (CRINGELY, 2013; ROGOWSKY, 2013). 
(ii) To support Ballmer’s (CEO Microsoft) new devices and services strategy for 
the Microsoft (CRINGELY, 2013). 
(iii) The deal will bring 32,000 Nokia employees on board of Microsoft. It will 
transform Microsoft into a true multinational company with all the tax flexibility 
(CRINGELY, 2013). 
(iv) Acquisition of a global brand and an effort to keep Nokia away from jumping 
into the Android camp (CRINGELY, 2013). 
(v) To create a setup which gives Nokia full control over the Windows Phone 
platform, and Microsoft does not want to lose its primacy over its mobile 
efforts (WILHELM, 2013). 
(vi) Apple and Google control mobile software and hardware, which allows them 
to push their own services to users. Microsoft can do the same by acquiring 
Nokia phone business (WILHELM, 2013). 
(vii) It is a mile stone in Microsoft’s efforts to break Apple and Google’s hold on 
smartphone business (WILLIAMS, 2013). 
(viii) The deal will protect Windows Phone platform future and will make it may 
make it more competitive & can give impetus to innovation (BARRETT, 2013; 
OVIDE, 2013).   
  
[http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/us/] 
Licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 3.0 United States License 
 
INDEPENDENT JOURNAL OF MANAGEMENT & PRODUCTION (IJM&P) 
http://www.ijmp.jor.br               v. 5, n. 3, June - September 2014 
ISSN: 2236-269X 
DOI: 10.14807/ijmp.v5i3.166 
609 
(ix) Microsoft currently makes less than $10 from every Windows Phone unit sold; 
that number may go up when it's all in-house (BARRETT, 2013). 
(x) Nokia's Lumia smartphones are beautiful, well-designed, solid, and top build 
quality. Lumia didn't sell well, but still more successful than Microsoft's 
Surface tablet. Nokia Lumia will guarantee that Microsoft's push into 
smartphones is not an embarrassment (BARRETT, 2013). 
(xi) The deal provided an opportunity for better Utilization of cash Microsoft kept 
away from the US taxman (TIMMONS, 2013). 
(xii) Finland is planning to cut its corporate tax rate to 20% from 24.5% to attract 
new business. It will be to the advantage of Microsoft (TIMMONS, 2013). 
(xiii) Ballmer Statement “Integration of two great teams will accelerate Microsoft’s 
share and profits in phones, and strengthen the overall opportunities for both 
Microsoft and our partners across our entire family of devices and services”. It 
mean new synergies will be created (METZ, 2013). 
(xiv) Google also bought an enormous collection of smartphone-related patents 
(more than 17000 patents at the total buy of $12.5 billion in Motorola deal in 
Motorola deal). Microsoft does the same with Nokia deal by buying 8,500 
design patents of Nokia (METZ, 2013; MILLER, 2102). 
(xv) It will help Microsoft to make more money per handset, less redundant 
marketing efforts and access to the source code for Nokia's mapping 
software. But if App Ecosystem is not improved by Microsoft it will be a naught 
(JOHNSON, 2013). 
(xvi) Microsoft was very keen to be in the Windows Phone smartphone business & 
also wants to bring Stephen Elop back to the company as CEO (WOLF, 
2013). 
(xvii) It is possible that Nokia threatened to switch to Android (the relevant contracts 
are getting close to renewal), rather as Motorola threatened to sue other 
Android OEMs before Google bought it (GRALLA, 2013). 
(xviii) Issues Related to Window Phone OS: Restrictions on Lumia 1020 camera 
software. A Bluetooth file sharing feature is particularly popular in developing 
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countries, but Microsoft wasn’t aware as US consumers don’t typically use it. 
It can exploit these features in developing countries (WORSTALL, 2013). 
7. IMPACT OF THE BUYOUT ON STAKEHOLDERS OF ECOSYSTEM 
 As reported by large number of experts of the industry, the deal will have a 
huge impact on the ecosystem of the mobile phone industry across the globe. It may 
put breaks on Android to convert present Unipolar OS market (as evident from the 
data given in tables A1 to A6) in to Multi-polar OS Market. Additional impacts of the 
deal are listed in the following.     
(i) Shares of Microsoft slid as much as 6% in the afternoon of the deal date, 
reducing market value of Microsoft by $15 billion, as investors protested the 
acquisition of an underperforming and marginalized corporation that lost more 
than $4 billion in 2012 (REUTERS, 2013). It is in sync with synergy trap 
hypothesis in the context of mergers and acquisitions (MYEONG-CHEOL, et 
al. 2002). 
(ii) It will brings an end to Nokia’s three-decades-long adventure mobile phones 
selling, as well as speculation about a future sale to Redmond, dating back to 
the moment Nokia announced a former Microsoft executive, Stephen Elop, 
would take the reins in September 2010 (OLSON, 2013). 
(iii) The deal will make Microsoft a big time hardware player, and Nokia will shift 
focus to technologies and software (RAJAN, 2013). Nokia will focus on its 
three established businesses, i.e., (a) network infrastructure and services; (b) 
mapping and location services; and (c) advanced technologies (RAJAN, 
2013).   
(iv) It will position Microsoft as number three provider in the smartphone domain 
(ROGOWSKY, 2013). 
(v) It will effectively end the Windows Phone licensing business. It may not be 
true. Business model of Microsoft may emerge more innovative 
(ROGOWSKY, 2013). 
(vi) It's a bold step into the future - a win-win for employees, shareholders and 
consumers of both companies (ASSOCIATED PRESS, 2013). 
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(vii) It will expand the range of applications on Microsoft products. It may also 
force the competitors as well as Microsoft to innovate more in all segments of 
the mobile phone business. 
(viii) Nokia shares jumped as much as 48 percent in Helsinki as the deal with 
Microsoft removes a money-losing handset business and lets Nokia focus on 
higher-margin networking gear (BASS; HEISKANEN; FICKLING, 2013). It is 
again in sync with synergy trap hypothesis in the context of mergers and 
acquisitions (MYEONG-CHEOL, et al. 2002). 
(ix) Windows phone partners such as HTC, Samsung and Huawei will be loser 
(MIMS, 2013). It is yet to be proved. 
(x) Asha OS: Microsoft has bought Nokia’s line of Asha quasi-smart phones. 
These devices are halfway in between “dumb phones” and smartphones in 
features and processing power. Nokia has done an impressive job of making 
them into an affordable alternatives to smartphones for emerging markets. It 
may be end for Asha OS if it is replaced with Windows (MIMS, 2013). 
(xi) Blackberry can no longer count on a Microsoft acquisition to save it (MIMS, 
2013). 
(xii) Samsung just recently pulled ahead of Nokia in India, and if Microsoft bungles 
the transition of India’s Asha fans to Windows Phone, a transition that might 
not work even under the best circumstances. It will be an advantage to 
Samsung (MIMS, 2013). 
(xiii) Huawei, ZTE and Samsung are already leading the Android charge in 
emerging markets, but right on their heels are the “no-name” manufacturers of 
Android phones, which already produce 1 in 4 Android handsets. If Asha is 
out of the race in India, the local manufacturers could make further inroads 
into a huge new market (MIMS, 2013). 
(xiv) The acquisition may solve Nokia's problem of cash (GRALLA, 2013).  
(xv) It had prevented the only Windows Phone original equipment manufacturer 
(OEM) from vanishing from the market (GRALLA, 2013).  
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(xvi) Microsoft would obviously reduce or remove the high charges for licensing its 
mobile operating system. Hence there is a possibility of getting low-priced 
Lumia phones very soon (DATTA, 2013). 
(xvii) OEMs may develop their own ‘non-Google’ version of the Android OS, and 
may become independent of existing OS developers (PATHAK, 2013). 
(xviii) Both Microsoft and BlackBerry will be competing for the third place in the war 
of operating systems specifically in the enterprise space (PATHAK, 2013). 
(xix) Nokia’s mobile telephony patents (10,000 in number) may put a little more 
financial strain on Korean Handset Manufacturers (Samsung, LG Electronics, 
and Pantech) (BUSINESS KOREA, 2013). 
(xx) Nokia focus was on Asian Markets. Microsoft will focus on USA & Europe 
Markets (SINGH, 2013). Microsoft may also focus on Asian markets. 
(xxi) It may result in to breakup of Microsoft into at least two separate operating 
businesses: one focused on consumers and one on enterprises (WOLF, 
2013). 
(xxii) Microsoft will not lay off employees of Nokia. It will be ethical practice and may 
enhance job satisfaction among employees. It is in line with the theories of Lin 
and Wei (2006).  
8. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 The world is short of business models in the domain of smartphone business. 
It is battle of the supremacy between manufacturers of the handsets versus mobile 
operating system providers. Though the world of mobile OS is divided between 
Google, Apple, and Microsoft, but it is now between Android V/s rest OS providers. 
This is evident from the data given in table A1, A3 and A4. This is the reason author 
termed Mobile OS world as a unipolar world. At the moment mobile operating system 
providers have upper hand over handset manufacturers. Hall (2013) mentioned that 
Microsoft has acquired Nokia “to accelerate its share and profits in phones, to create 
a first-rate Microsoft phone experience for its users, to prevent Google and Apple 
from foreclosing app innovation, integration, distribution and economics”.   
 Many initiatives are taken by Nokia similar to the competitors. To mention, 
Samsung has branded Android products around Galaxy. In response, Nokia also 
  
[http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/us/] 
Licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 3.0 United States License 
 
INDEPENDENT JOURNAL OF MANAGEMENT & PRODUCTION (IJM&P) 
http://www.ijmp.jor.br               v. 5, n. 3, June - September 2014 
ISSN: 2236-269X 
DOI: 10.14807/ijmp.v5i3.166 
613 
tried to use Lumia. Rebranding of "Nokia Maps" to "HERE Maps" on non-Symbian 
platforms makes a total sense because map side of Nokia is free to expand in other 
markets (LITCHFIELD, 2013). It has been reported that Nokia’s execution has been 
shoddy in recent years; it doesn’t mean it can’t make a comeback with Windows 
Phone. Nokia and Microsoft have huge assets. It may come out to be a good 
chemistry & Windows Phone may be a great success. Even, Nokia’s Mobile 
Telephony Patents may put a Strain on Korean Handset Manufacturers.    
 Microsoft may bring in to the market powerful combination of low-cost, secure, 
functional smartphones. It may integrate across multiple devices e.g. smartphones, 
PCs and game console, that can meet the requirement of individual and businesses 
users. Microsoft can incorporate Yammer, Skype, Xbox, Outlook and Office to 
compete with Google Android.  Recent entry of new operating system players like 
Ubuntu, Firefox and Tizen will make war of smartphone operating systems very 
interesting in days to come. In addition, growth of small local vendors will provide a 
good competition to Microsoft. To mention, two local vendors such as Micromax, 
Karbonn in India are competing with international brands as can be seen from the 
data given in Table A5 & Table A6.  
 The bigger issues with Microsoft could be integration of the employees of 
Nokia as well as phone business, competing with Google, be a device company or a 
services company. It is not like Google at the moment as Microsoft is not removing 
Nokia employees from jobs. It is in line with findings of Lin and Wei (2006). Buyout 
also proves the synergy trap hypothesis of Myeong-Cheol Park, et al. (2002). For 
other two hypothesis data is not yet generated by the merger. 
 In the end, it is summarized that present Mobile OS world is “Unipolar” world 
as far as mobile operating system is concerned. Still the ecosystem will consist of 
many Mobile OS players which will compete successfully with Android, and all 
categories of mobile phones manufacturers due to economic conditions of the users 
in different parts of the world. It will include international, national, as well as local 
brands. This conclusion is somewhat in line of conclusion of Singh and Nayeem 
(2011) in case of expansion strategies of biggies in Business Intelligence domain. 
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ANNEXURE 
Table A1: Top Smartphone Operating Systems, Shipments, and Market Share, 2013 
Q3 (Units in Millions) 
Operating 
System 
2Q13 Unit 
Shipments 
2Q13 Market 
Share % 
2Q12 Unit 
Shipments 
2Q12 
Market 
Share % 
Year-Over-
Year Change 
% 
Android  187.4 79.3 108 69.1 73.5 
iOS 31.2 13.2 26 16.6 20.0 
Windows 
Phone 
8.7 3.7 4.9 3.1 77.6 
Blackberry OS 6.8 2. 7.7 4.9 -11.7 
Linux 1.8 0.8 2.8 1.8 -35.7 
Symbian 0.5 0.2 6.5 4.2 -92.3 
Others N/A 0.0 0.3 0.3 -100.0 
Total 236.4 100 156.2 100. 51.3 
      
Source: IDC Worldwide Mobile Tracker, August 07, 2013 
Continued… 
Operating System 2Q11 Unit 
Shipments 
2Q11 Market 
Share % 
2Q10 Unit 
Shipments 
2Q10 Market 
Share % 
Android  50.8 46.97 20.5 25.5 
iOS 20.4 18.8 13.5 16.7 
Windows Phone 2.5 2.3 2.2 2.8 
Blackberry OS 12.5 11.5 11.9 14.8 
Linux 3.3 3.0 1.7 2.1 
Symbian 18.3 16.9 29.5 36.6 
Others 0.6 0.5 1.2 1.5 
Total 108.3 100  80.5 100 
     
Source: For 2010: http://tamss60.tamoggemon.com/2010/11/14/gartner-on-smartphone-marketshare-q3-2010/ 
For 2011: http://www.idc.com/getdoc.jsp?containerId=prUS23638712 
Continued… 
Operating 
System 
2Q09 Unit 
Shipments 
2Q09 Market 
Share (%) 
2Q08 Unit 
Shipments 
2Q08 Market 
Share (%) 
Year-Over-
Year Change 
(%) 
Android  1.2 2.8 - - - 
iOS 5.2 13.7 0.7 2.1 626.9 
Windows 
Phone 
3.4 9.0 4.8 14.3 -28.7 
Blackberry OS 8.0 20.9 5.6 16.7 41.6 
Symbian 19.2 50.3 19.6 58.2 -2.1 
Others 1.2 3.3 2.9 8.6 -56.8 
Total 38.1 100 33.6 100 100 
      
Source: http://radar.oreilly.com/2009/08/whos-winning-the-smartphone-wa.html 
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Table A2: Worldwide Mobile Terminal Sales to End Users in 3Q10 (Thousands of 
Units) 
Company  Q3 2009 Q3 Share 
in % 
Q3 2010 Q3 Share 
in % 
Q3 2011 Q3 2011 
Share in 
% 
Nokia 113,466.20 36.7 117,461.00 28.2 82,612.20 18.7
Samsung 60,627.70 19.6 71,671.80 17.2 105,353.50 23.9
LG 31,901.40 10.3 27,478.70 6.6 17,295.30 3.9
Apple 7,040.40 2.3 13,484.40 3.2 14,107.80 3.2
Research In 
Motion 
8,522.70 2.8 11,908.30 2.9 
21,014.60 4.8
Sony Ericsson 13,409.50 4.3 10,346.50 2.5 10,668.20 2.4
Motorola 13,912.80 4.5 8,961.40 2.1 9,004.70 2
HTC 2,659.50 0.9 6,494.30 1.6 12,701.10 2.9
ZTE 4,143.70 1.3 6,003.60 1.4 11,182.70 2.5
Huawei 
Technologies 
3,339.70 1.1 5,478.10 1.3 
12,099.90 2.7
Others 49,871.10 16 137,797.60 33 145,462.20 32.9
Total 308,894.70 100 417,085.70 100 441,502.20 100
Source: Ranger, (2013) 
2009, 2010:  http://www.gartner.com/newsroom/id/1466313 
2011: http://www.gartner.com/newsroom/id/2237315 
Continued… 
     
Company  Q3 2012 Q3 2012 Share 
in % 
Q2 2013 Q2 2013 Share 
in % 
Samsung 97,956.80 22.9 107,526.0 24.7
Nokia 82,300.60 19.2 60,953.7 14.0
Apple 23,550.30 5.5 31,899.7 7.3
ZTE 16,654.20 3.9 15.280.7 3.5
LG Electronics 13,968.80 3.3 17,016.4 3.9
Huawei Device 11,918.90 2.8 11,275.1 2.6
TCL Communication 9,326.70 2.2 10,134.3 2.3
Research in Motion 8,946.80 2.1 - -
Motorola 8,562.70 2 - -
HTC 8,428.60 2 - -
Others 146,115.10 34.2 181,072.5 41.7
Total 427,729.50 100 435,158.4 100
Source: 2012:  http://www.gartner.com/newsroom/id/2237315 
2013: http://www.gartner.com/newsroom/id/2573415 
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Table A3: Smart Phone OS Sales (%) in Select Countries 
Germany 3m/e 
July 
2012 
3m/e 
July 
2013 
% 
Change 
USA 3m/e 
July 
2012 
3m/e 
July 
2013 
% 
Change 
iOS 13.3 11.2 -2.1 iOS 35.6 43.4 7.8 
Android  73.3 76.8 3.4 Android 58.7 51.1 -7.6 
BlackBerry 0.6 0.8 -0.2 BlackBerry 1.9 1.2 -0.7 
Symbian 5.0 1.4 -3.6 Symbian 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Windows 6.2 8.8 2.6 Windows 3.0 3.5 0.5 
Others 1.5 1.0 -0.5 Others 0.9 0.8 -0.1 
GB 3m/e 
July 
2012 
3m/e 
July 
2013 
% 
Change 
China 3m/e 
July 
2012 
3m/e 
July 
2013 
% 
Change 
iOS 23.3 31.1 7.8 iOS 26.3 22.4 -3.9 
Android  59.1 55.2 -3.8 Android 61.7 70.5 8.8 
BlackBerry 11.0 3.5 -7.5 BlackBerry 0.1 0.1 0.0 
Symbian 1.7 0.5 -1.2 Symbian 5.2 2.9 -2.2 
Windows 4.2 9.2 5.0 Windows 4.6 2.4 -2.2 
Others 0.7 0.4 -0.3 Others 2.2 1.6 -0.5 
France 3m/e 
July 
2012 
3m/e 
July 
2013 
% 
Change 
Australia 3m/e 
July 
2012 
3m/e 
July 
2013 
% 
Change 
iOS 12.7 17.3 4.6 iOS 28.0 28.1 0.1 
Android  62.1 62.5 0.4 Android 62.9 62.0 -0.9 
BlackBerry 9.2 3.7 -5.5 BlackBerry 1.4 0.3 -1.1 
Symbian 2.1 1.5 -0.6 Symbian 1.8 1.1 -0.7 
Windows 3.6 11.0 7.4 Windows 4.6 7.0 2.4 
Others 10.3 4.1 -6.2 Others 1.3 1.4 0.4 
Italy 3m/e 
July 
2012 
3m/e 
July 
2013 
% 
Change 
Mexico 3m/e 
July 
2012 
3m/e 
July 
2013 
% 
Change 
iOS 14.8 16.2 1.5 iOS 3.3 9.2 5.8 
Android  58.2 71.0 12.8 Android 28.3 60.0 31.7 
BlackBerry 4.1 1.8 -1.2 BlackBerry 34.9 10.0 -25.0 
Symbian 12.4 1.8 -10.5 Symbian 24.7 7.3 -17.5 
Windows 8.3 7.8 -0.5 Windows 2.0 12.5 10.5 
Others 2.3 0.3 -2.0 Others 6.7 1.1 -5.6 
Spain 3m/e 
July 
2012 
3m/e 
July 
2013 
% 
Change 
EUS 3m/e 
July 
2012 
3m/e 
July 
2013 
% 
Change 
iOS 2.9 6.1 3.1 iOS 14.8 17.9 3.1 
Android  82.5 89.9 7.3 Android 66.2 69.1 2.9 
BlackBerry 9.4 0.7 -8.7 BlackBerry 6.7 2.4 -4.3 
Symbian 2.1 0.7 -1.5 Symbian 4.3 1.1 -3.1 
Windows 1.7 1.8 0.1 Windows 4.9 8.2 3.3 
Others 1.4 0.9 -0.5 Others 3.2 1.3 -1.9 
Source: http://techpinions.com/windows-phone-android-and-hate/22730 
 
 
Table A4: India Smartphone Share by Operating System 
Operating System 2012 2017 Source 
Android 74% 74% Singh (2013) 
Window Phone 4% 15%  
Apple iOS 3% 6%  
Blackberry 6% 4%  
Others 14% 1%  
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Table A5: Market Share of Feature Phones 
Manufacturer 2011 Q2 2012 Q2 2013 Q2 Source 
Nokia 23% 17% 15% Singh (2013) 
Samsung 14% 17% 12%  
Karbonn 5% 5% 8%  
Micromax 8% 5% 8%  
Others 50% 56% 57%  
 
Table A6: Smart Phone Market Share in India 
Manufacturer 2011 Q2 2012 Q2 2013 Q2 Source 
Nokia 46% 17% 5% Singh (2013) 
Samsung 21% 50% 26%  
Karbonn 0% 1% 13%  
Micromax 1% 6% 22%  
Others 32% 24% 34%  
 
  
 
 
